This is a work of fiction created for the Twilight 2000 Role Playing Game. Original material © Dave Ross
The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security)
Despite the best efforts of the British Security Service, a small number of operatives from the Soviet Union’s national security agency remain active in the UK, both in the territory controlled by HMG and further afield. All are operating under deep cover, posing either as British nationals or, in a few cases, nationals of allied or neutral nations.
The senior KGB officer in the UK is forty year old Colonel Mikhail I Romanov. A highly experienced officer, Romanov first arrived in the UK as a KGB “Illegal”, or undercover operative, in January 1995. Based in London, he left the British capital in late November 1997, having been alerted to the impending Black Thursday nuclear strikes by a coded message from KGB Headquarters, and since mid 1998 he has been based in Reading, where he poses as Mike Metcalfe, a trader, who buys and sells various commodities, including hard to find luxury items. His cover and Reading’s location on the borders of the territory controlled by HMG gives him a good excuse to travel regularly throughout southern England. It also allows him to employ a number of people, mainly as drivers and “security”. Whilst most of these employees are British nationals who are obviously unaware of their employer’s true identity, one man, Captain Alexei M Kuznetzov, is a KGB officer.
Romanov and Kuznetzov are both usually armed with Browning 9mms, for which they have legitimate permits (Romanov’s cover as a trader has enabled him to make a number of contacts with the British authorities). Romanov is also aware of the locations of several hidden caches of weapons, ammunition, and equipment, including a large one just outside Reading that contains weapons, ammunition, explosives, and fuel. The other operatives have access to a variety of weapons as and when required.
One of Romanov’s major problems is currently lack of communications; all of the personnel in the UK are currently completely out of contact with any higher headquarters in the Soviet Union or elsewhere as well as being out of contact with each other to a large extent (in theory Romanov is in charge of all KGB operations in the UK, however in practice he only controls the activities of the group based in HMG’s territory plus one other officer who is based in Swindon, with the operatives located elsewhere all acting autonomously). Romanov is aware that a supply cache just outside Chesterfield contains a radio, which he hopes would allow him to reestablish contact with the Rodina, but so far it has proved too hazardous to try and retrieve it (one officer was sent from southern England at the start of the year but has not been heard from for several months.
The GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye, Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff)
The intelligence arm of the Soviet armed forces, the GRU maintains a small and discrete presence in the United Kingdom, with half a dozen intelligence officers in various locations throughout the UK. Like their KGB counterparts, they are all operating under deep cover and are out of contact with each other and any higher headquarters. Unlike the KGB, the GRU has no nominal head in the UK, its station chief and several other officers having been killed on Black Thursday (for reasons that have never been identified, unlike the KGB the GRU’s senior leadership in the UK were not pre warned of the impending nuclear strikes, so did not have the opportunity to leave London; ironically the lack of radio chatter between Moscow and GRU officers in the UK was a factor in persuading British intelligence that an attack was not expected).
The most prominent of the GRU’s operatives is twenty nine year old Major Natalia Y Ivanova. Born to an East German mother and a Russian father who is a serving General in the Red Army, Ivanova is fluent in five languages (including English, French, and German), and is an utterly ruthless young woman who is completely loyal to the Soviet Union. Infiltrated into the UK in early 1998, she has managed to establish herself in Portsmouth under the alias Lisa Ross*, and has been successful in developing a number of sources, all of whom are ignorant of the fact that she is a Soviet officer. They provide her with information, which she is collating until such times as she is able to relay it to a higher headquarters.
Perhaps the most useful of these sources is Commander Paul McDonald, a US Navy officer on the staff of HQ US Naval Forces Europe, who is utterly infatuated with her. Ivanova is aware of McDonald’s feelings for her and is using them to manipulate him, obtaining information (and gifts) from him in exchange for hints that she will sleep with him (something she has not yet done, but would be prepared to do so if she felt it necessary). McDonald is a senior officer in HQUSNAVEUR’s communications section, and has recently begun handling top secret message traffic about something called OMEGA. These messages would be of great interest to Ivanova.
Like the KGB, the GRU has a small number of supply caches hidden at various points throughout the UK. Whilst most of these caches consist of small arms, ammunition, and small amounts of explosives, one cache in the Peak District, a relatively remote part of central England, contains two RA115 tactical nuclear devices or “suitcase nukes”, each of which has a five kiloton yield. Whilst the cache’s location is known to all of the GRU officers in the UK, the existence of the nukes is not – that was a fact known only to the station chief and his deputy, and died with them on Black Thursday.
* The real Lisa Ross was an RAF Tornado Navigator who was shot down over Eastern Poland in spring 1997. Captured by the GRU and interrogated under torture, the Soviets were able to create a false identity based on her life before she joined the RAF. Ivanova participated in several of Ross’s interrogations, and ultimately executed the Englishwoman herself.
KGB / GRU Relations
Whilst the two Soviet agencies are not actively opposed to each other, they do not openly co operate with each other; they each have their own agendas and operations, with each agency unaware of the identities and locations of the other agency’s officers, supply caches, etc.